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Introduction 
This paper provides a descriptive account of changes in European market entry regulations for 
pharmaceuticals that were passed in early 2004. However, our interest goes beyond 
description, as we are also interested in the dynamics of EU policy making and integration more 
generally. Since the 1960s, EU pharmaceuticals regulation has moved from legal 
harmonization, with the expectation of mutual recognition, to a complicated system that 
combines national regulatory procedures and mutual recognition requirements with direct EU-
level regulation. Even though pharmaceuticals regulation has a direct effect on questions of 
public health, the European Union has successfully wrested considerable control from member 
states. Furthermore, the EU pharmaceuticals agency, EMEA (established in 1995 and renamed 
EMA in the latest legislative reform), has become an evaluatory body with considerable 
authority and impact on regulatory decisions at the European level, even though nominally it is 
not a US-style independent regulatory agency (IRA). (Majone 1997b, Kelemen 1997) 
Did EU pharmaceuticals policy enter a trajectory towards European-level authority that by now 
has evolved into some king of self-sustained dynamic process? Or are we observing the output 
of policy coalitions involving social and institutional interests, whose Europeanizing decisions 
may be as easily revoked as they may be advanced? Considering that pharmaceuticals policy 
has been frequently viewed as a strong case for positive integration and European-level 
regulation, answers to those questions may help us understand the dynamics of EU politics in 
more general terms as well. 
In this paper, we investigate revisions to the system of European medicines authorization that 
were passed in early 2004. The 1993 legislation establishing the Centralized Procedure of 
European pharmaceuticals authorization as well as the European Medicines Evaluation Agency 
(EMEA) (Regulation 2309/93/EEC) provided for a report by the Commission on the experiences 
with this Regulation six years after the new procedures had come into effect. Following 
evaluatory reports by different actors, the most extensive one on behalf of the Commission 
prepared by Consulting firms Anderson and Cameron/McKennan (European Commission 2000, 
October), the Commission launched a broad “review” process in 2001 to revise the existing 
system, which ended in 2004 with the passage of several pieces of legislation (Regulation (EC) 
726/2004 and Directives 2004/27/EC and 2004/28/EC). We are interested in the extent to which 
the 2004 reforms have expanded the Europeanization of pharmaceuticals regulation in terms of 
the harmonization of standards, a further shift of regulatory decision-making authority to the   3
European level, and an increase in the “European character” of the regulatory bodies, especially 
EMEA (now: EMA) and its Scientific Committee, CPMP (now:CHMP). In addition, we try to 
identify the social, political, and institutional actors whose interests are reflected in the various 
policy changes, in order to get a sense of whether the changes might have been due to specific 
demands or whether they seem to exhibit a largely irreversible dynamic. 
In order to make our analysis manageable, we had to select a limited number of reform issues 
for analysis. First, we focus only on provisions dealing with medicines for human use, even 
though parts of the legislation deal with veterinary medicines. Second, we only analyze issues 
concerning the marketing approval of medicines, thereby ignoring equally important and 
somehow parallel questions related to post-marketing pharmacovigilance or advertising of 
medicines. Third, we selected issues that were important, according to the perception of the 
different actors involved in the policy-making process. Fourth, we analyze only those issues that 
directly or indirectly deal with the harmonization of national regulatory behavior and/or the 
localization of power for operational regulatory decision making. 
The background and empirical basis of our research has been a thorough historical analysis of 
European regulation in this policy field from its beginning in the 1960s and, especially, the 
political process and legislative output of the Legislative Review 2001-2004. Our analyses are 
based on legal documents, protocols or results of institutional negotiations and debates, on 
primary and secondary material reflecting the position of concerned and/or affected groups and 
on interviews with representatives of the most important actors in this process, be they 
institutional participants at the European or national levels or “outside” actors trying to influence 
the policy-making process. 
Before we present our analysis, we will provide some thoughts on the extent to which our close 
analysis of institutional changes might contribute to an answer of our general question 
concerning a trajectory towards regulatory Europeanization. To this end we try to develop 
indicators which should be able to tell whether a policy measure contributes to the 
Europeanization path or not. We then provide a brief overview of the history of European 
pharmaceuticals authorization rules and procedures, followed by a description of the different 
issues of the Legislative Review that we chose to analyze. A detailed discussion of regulatory 
changes, the interest articulation concerning the various issues and their resolution in terms of   4
our theoretical question ensues. We conclude with a discussion of what we have learned from 
our investigation of this one policy field. 
Europeanization and its dynamics: What we are looking for 
The empirical investigation in this paper focuses on two related questions. First, we want to 
know whether the 2001-2004 revision of EU medicines authorization resulted in a higher degree 
of European-level control of authorization processes and decisions. Second, we ask whether 
any increase in European-level control is part of a trend, or at least likely to persist, or whether it 
is the outcome of a unique bargaining situation that may change and lead to a return to 
increased member state control in the future. 
The first question, concerning the level of policymaking, leads us to several more specific 
questions whose answers all contribute to an understanding of what is commonly called 
Europeanization: 
(a) The constitutional (treaty) basis of the decision making process determines the degree 
to which lawmaking is dominated by intergovernmental or supranational processes. 
Specifically with respect to the revision of EU pharmaceuticals legislation, the question 
was whether Article 95 TEU (codecision process and qualified majority rule in the 
Council) or Article 308 TEU (consultation procedure and unanimity rule in the Council) 
should apply. Intergovernmental processes retain member state authority and control of 
policy-setting, if not implementation, whereas supranational policy-setting processes 
endow European Union institutions with varying degrees of decision-making power. 
(b) The control of European-level actors over implementing decisions is an important aspect 
of the Europeanization of policy, as it determines that community rules are in fact 
executed in a uniform manner (or at least in a manner controlled by a EU-level 
authority). In fact, member state control over implementing decisions has in the past 
restricted the effectiveness of EU attempts of creating a single market for medicines 
(Feick 2002a). 
(c) Administrative control over implementing policies and European-level making policy 
making authority are related to each other in a complex manner that interacts with the 
supranational/intergovernmental character of agencies. First, the degree to which 
national implementing bodies retain an autonomous role in the implementation process   5
influences the European character of the overall policy-making process. Second, the 
independence of European-level agencies and the degree to which their composition is 
controlled by European-level actors influences the degree to which decisions-making is 
Europeanized. If EU agencies are independent and staffing decisions are made through 
supranational processes, member state influence on implementing decisions tends to be 
limited. On the other hand, EU agencies that are independent of the Commission may 
be more susceptible to member state influence if member states can influence the 
selection of staff. Still, even member state appointed staff may develop “cosmopolitan” 
orientations that transcend member state interests (Majone 2002). As a result, the 
specific manner in which administrative autonomy interacts with supranational control of 
policy implementation cannot be determined a priori, but it is important, and possible, to 
detect the relationship empirically. 
(d) At the output-side of the policy process, the question is whether, and which, standards 
have been further harmonized at the European level. Whereas community procedures to 
authorize individual products affect Europeanization with regard to specific products, 
harmonized standards and decision criteria set general rules to be followed in the entire 
community, provided they are adequately, or equivalently, applied at the national level. 
The question in terms of Europeanization is how much discretionary space at the 
national implementation level can be eliminated through legal harmonization at the 
European level. 
While it is comparatively easy to describe the degree of Europeanization of a policy, at least in 
an inexact manner, it is much more difficult to deduce likely future trends from such a 
description. However, it is possible to use existing theories of integration and institutionalization 
to make a theoretically informed guess about the dynamics of substantive and institutional 
changes and the persistence of specific changes. Integration theories identify factors that are 
hypothesized to lead to integration and institution-building; several of those factors suggest 
dynamic processes. Factors that competing theories posit as driving forces of historical trends 
are particularly strong indicators. As we are using theoretical concepts to make guesses about 
the dynamics of European policy making, our ability to test those theories is very limited. 
Predictions about the future can be tested only in the future, of course. However, as theories of 
integration posit that certain factors are usually present in European policy making, our 
empirical results will reflect on the validity of those theories.   6
The classic example of a dynamic theory of European integration is Haas’s neofunctionalism 
(Haas 2004). His central concept of spill-over is based on a hypothesis about the orientation of 
social actors: As European integration progresses, societal actors such as interest associations 
direct their objectives and interests towards the European level of decision making. In the most 
extreme characterization, Haas suggests collusion between the European Commission and 
societal actors, effectively bypassing member state governments.  
We do not need to review the debate over neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism (see e.g. 
(Wolf 1999), but it is worth noting that even theories decisively critical of Haas’s approach agree 
that the orientation of societal actors may change as a result of integration and induce further 
integration. Moravcsik, for example, submits that governmental positions, the foundation of 
intergovernmental bargaining processes, may become more pro-European due to an increasing 
European orientation of society, which in turn may be the result of increasing European 
interdependence – indirectly an effect of EU policy making (Moravcsik 1998). As a result, the 
question of societal support or opposition to specific Europeanizing measures is an important 
indicator of the dynamics of European policy making
1. If we can identify a general societal 
orientation towards European-level decision making, it is more likely that Europeanization will 
proceed in the future. If, however, support for Europeanizing measures is clearly split, we 
should be skeptical with our expectations. Similarly, if the focus of societal debate is explicitly on 
the Europeanization of decision making, with a clear split between those in favor and those 
opposed to European-level decision making authority, we should be skeptical that claims of 
Europeanizing trends are true. On the other hand, if the main debate centers around 
substantive policy choices but not on the level of decision making, it is well possible that 
Europeanization will continue in the future.  
More recently, theories based on the concept of path dependence have replaced 
neofunctionalism as the dynamic integration theory of choice. Path dependence theorists such 
as Pierson have viewed European integration as the unintended consequence of negotiated 
agreements among member states (Pierson 1996). Once European Union institutions and 
decision-making processes have been established, there are positive returns for further 
European integration, resulting from a variety of mechanisms: more relevant and influential 
                                                 
1 It should be noted that the question of general societal support for Europeanization, we refer not only to so-called 
societal interests – interests of actors that are not part of the governmental process – but also to political and 
administrative actors, whose political orientation can be “Europeanized” as well, with important consequences 
(Majone 2002, Wessels 1997).    7
actors may have a stake in further European integration; integration may change the economic 
conditions and dynamics so that further integration is economically functional, or European 
institutions, such as the European Court of Justice, obtain power resources that help them 
pursue further Europeanization. 
Path dependency considerations suggest a number of indicators of Europeanizing trends. First, 
the question of European-level versus state-level policy making/implementation will be 
contested only when a new institutional system is established (at a so-called critical juncture). 
After that, the level of policy-making/implementation authority should not be one of the main 
points of contestation. Second, we should be able to observe actors whose support for EU-level 
regulatory authority can plausibly be the result of the establishment of such authority, and their 
support of European decision making secures the continuing existence of the institutional 
system. Third, European institutions themselves may be able to secure the continuing existence 
of the Europeanized system of policy-making because they are able to fulfill functions which 
might be difficult to relocate (an increasing return or lock-in mechanism), and/or because they 
have gained a position which allows them to successfully pursue their organizational self-
interest. These indicators are neither necessary nor exhaustive, but they are the most likely 
observables that lend support to a path dependency account of European medicines 
authorization, which in turn would suggest a trend towards Europeanization. 
The status quo before the Review: A historical overview 
The history of EU pharmaceuticals regulation has been discussed more thoroughly elsewhere 
(see e.g.;Hart and Reich 1990, Deboyser 1991, Hancher 1996, Abraham and Lewis 2000, Feick 
2002b). Here we provide only a brief overview of the changes that European medicines 
authorization went through since the 1960s. In addition, this section serves as a summary of the 
policy status quo before the legislative revision that is the main focus of our study. 
The regulation of pharmaceuticals is a complex domain comprising very different regulatory 
sub-fields (Feick 2000). Practically every detail of the product itself, substantial parts of 
research, development, production, commercialization and medical utilization are regulated in 
one way or another in developed societies. However, only a small part of this regulatory 
spectrum has found its way into EU-level legislation, partly due to the ambiguous status of 
medicines regulation in EU law. On the one hand, medicinal products are goods for which the 
EC/EU-Treaty goal of a common or single market applies; on the other hand, their supply and   8
consumption are important ingredients of social security and health care systems, for which the 
national prerogative of public health protection largely applies (see TEC, Art. 30, formerly Art. 
36), even after the extension of the EU’s responsibilities to health matters in the Maastricht 
Treaty (see Art. 129). The tool of negative integration (Scharpf 1999, 2001), so potent in the 
hands of the Commission and the ECJ in other product and service areas, has been of very 
limited use in the pharmaceuticals sector.
2 Consensus or – since the extension of qualified-
majority voting in the Council – quasi-consensus are needed in order to advance European 
legislation in these matters, thus largely protecting the principle of national voluntarism (Streeck 
1995, 1997) in this sector. 
Despite these regulatory obstacles, market entry for pharmaceuticals can be regarded as an 
exceptional subfield in which European regulation has advanced, over a period of thirty years, 
from legal harmonization targeted at national legislation and implementation to the centralization 
of regulatory implementation at the European level – at least for parts of the medicines’ market. 
Thus, market entry regulation for pharmaceuticals can be read, at least partly, as a success 
story of Europeanization and as a strong case for discussing the question whether an 
irreversible regulatory trend or path has been opened, and if so, which factors are supporting 
this path, and whether they might be of such a general nature that other sectors could also be 
subject to their influence. On the other hand, if there are important factors counteracting 
Europeanization in such a comparatively successful (in terms of Europeanization) regulatory 
field, we should be very cautious about the prospects of further Europeanization in 
pharmaceuticals and other policy areas. 
Legal harmonization and the failure of mutual recognition 
Europeanization of pharmaceuticals policy has been pursued by two different strategies, the 
harmonization of national legislation (Europeanization at the national level) and procedural 
integration (Europeanization at the European level). While the first strategy requires that national 
authorities recognize one another’s regulatory decisions, as they are based on harmonized law 
and expected equivalent implementation of that law, the second strategy requires the transfer of 
implementation power from the national to the European level. 
                                                 
2 In public health matters the general policy responsibilities of the EC-level have been somewhat enlarged through 
the Maastricht Treaty, but with still very little effect for pharmaceuticals regulation at large.   9
The first attempts to harmonies European pharmaceuticals authorization was partly the result of 
the thalidomide crisis of the late 1950s and early 1960s and the American experience of 
preventing such a crisis in the US (see (Kirk 1999); (Silverman and Lee 1974: 94-98)) .The 
directive of 1965, 65/65/EEC, prescribed formal national marketing approval procedures in all 
EEC member states but left the precise legal transformation and implementation to the discretion 
of national legislatures and governments (Blasius and Cranz 1998: 66-67). This approach has 
been incrementally extended over the years, specifying regulatory requirements for authorization 
applicants as well as for assessing and evaluating national authorities – two directives in 1975, 
75/318/EEC and 75/319/EEC,, were the next steps, followed by Commission communications, 
notes to applicants, etc..  
Legal harmonization went far beyond minimal standards but, nevertheless, failed to trigger mutual 
recognition. In the mid-seventies and again in the 1980s the Commission tried unsuccessfully to 
convince member states to accept automatic mutual recognition without further national 
assessments and evaluations (Bel 1975: 507-508). In its June 1985 White Paper, the Commission 
expressed the hope that the European Court of Justice’s (ECJ) 1978 Cassis-Dijon ruling would 
force national governments to accept mutual recognition of national controls of pharmaceuticals 
(Commission of the European Communities 1985, June 14 June 14: no 65). This hope was short-
lived: For policy fields of special complexity, such as pharmaceuticals control, the European Court 
of Justice was not willing to extent mutual recognition requirements. “[A]lthough the Court is 
prepared to narrow the scope for residual national measures under Article 36 …, it is unlikely to 
require automatic mutual recognition of product licenses given the present stage of harmonization 
of national licensing requirements” (Hancher 1991: 831). Incremental advances, such as further 
legal harmonization and the improvement of “coordination procedures,” were seen as the more 
“realistic perspective” (Glaeske 1988: 40-41). 
Non-binding institutional and procedural supports 
Besides further legal harmonization, the failure of mutual recognition led to the introduction of 
institutional supports that would encourage mutual recognition without actually requiring it. 
Between 1975 and 1983 several pseudo-European approval procedures were introduced on an 
optional basis, providing for enhanced communication and cooperation between national 
authorities without interfering in their final decisions – the so-called Community Procedure, 
introduced in 1975, was modified in 1983 and renamed Multi-State Procedure.) A scientific 
committee (the Committee for Proprietary Medicinal Products, CPMP) was created and located at   10
the Commission level in 1983; its members were representatives of national authorities, which 
could be consulted for assessments and evaluations. 
The so-called Concertation Procedure of 1987 was another major evolutionary step, with three 
important innovations: (a) the procedurally consequential separation of medicinal products into 
less or more innovative ones, the Concertation Procedure being reserved for the latter group (and 
required for the most innovative ones); (b) the obligation to consult the CPMP before a decision 
was taken at the national level, and (partly as a result of this) (c) an increase in importance of the 
CPMP body. Nevertheless, the final approval decision was with the national authorities. 
While the Community/Multi-State Procedure failed to achieve the goal of mutual recognition, the 
Concertation Procedure was comparatively more successful (European Commission 2000; Vos 
1999; Sauer 1990)  . There are two reasons for this: First, the restriction of the Concertation 
procedure to the more (and in particular the most) innovative products made it easier for national 
authorities to achieve common assessments and evaluations, as such products did not yet have 
national regulatory records. Second, the procedural requirement that the CPMP issue its opinion 
before national authorities could decide on theirs increased the chances that national decisions 
conformed to the CPMP model. However, while the Concertation Procedure resulted more often 
in similar national assessments, there were still national differences and efficiency losses as 
national authorities insisted on the conduct of national assessments in addition to the European 
assessment (see (Vos 1999: 206-211); (Macarthur 1993: 25-28); (European Commission 2000)). 
The 1990s: Procedural Europeanization 
In the early 1990s, the European Union introduced fundamental institutional changes by 
establishing two new authorization procedures that would, to a large extent, replace the existing 
procedures and create the three-layered system of pharmaceuticals authorization that still exists 
today (see Table 1). A 1993 Regulation
3 introduced the so-called Centralized Procedure (CP, in 
effect since January 1995), to be mandatory for biotechnology-based pharmaceuticals and 
optional for other innovative medicines. Hence, the CP replaced the older Concertation procedure. 
Similarly to the Concertation Procedure, the CP was based on CPMP assessments, but the final 
regulatory decision was now made by the Commission, subject to the regulatory comitology 
procedure, and not by the member state authorities. Member state authorities, however, were 
included in the decision-making process through their representation in CPMP and their important 
                                                 
3 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2309/93, OJ L 214, 24.8.1993.   11
participation in providing the basic assessments for CPMP through a rapporteur/co-rapporteur 
system. 
The second new authorization procedure was introduced by a 1993 Directive
4 and was applicable 
to all medicines introduced in more than one member state for which the Centralized Procedure 
was not obligatory. Called the Mutual Recognition Procedure (MRP), it built on the Multi-State 
Procedure, which it replaced. It introduced two main innovations: First, it restricted the grounds on 
which member states could reject another member state’s assessment (only potential risk to 
public health were acceptable grounds, though not sufficiently operationalised) and, second, it 
provided for mandatory EU-level arbitration if a member state rejected another member state’s 
assessment. But, in this procedure, the final marketing approval rests with the national authorities. 
Whereas the Centralized Procedure has been commonly viewed as a success, both in terms of 
European integration and regulatory efficiency, the Mutual Recognition Procedure has failed to 
guaranty quasi-automatic mutual recognition. Although the MRP tried to add teeth to mutual 
recognition by requiring binding EU-level arbitration, companies often used the exit-option of 
avoiding EU-level involvement by withdrawing the marketing application from the objecting 
member state(s). These experiences correspond to Majone’s conclusion that European 
“centralization of regulatory authority is the only way of ... preventing the local regulation ... from 
becoming a trade barrier,” (Majone 1996:279-280) – and of overruling distrust among national 
regulators (Majone 1998). 
The institutional changes of the 1990s included the establishment of a European agency, the 
European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products (EMEA), in which CPMP and other 
scientific committees (for example for veterinary medicines) have been located. It coordinates the 
assessment and evaluation of applications under the Centralized Procedure – in the Mutual 
Recognition Procedure it oversees binding arbitration – and formulates an opinion that forms the 
basis of a final regulatory decision by the Commission after going through a regulatory comitology 
procedure (Art. 10, Art. 72 and 73 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2309/93; see also Feick 
2002b).The emergence of European-level agencies, with a few exceptions mainly in 1990s 
((Everson 1995; Kreher 1996; Everson 1999), can be seen as an attempt to de-politicize and to 
professionalize regulatory decision-making (see e.g. (Majone 1997a; Thatcher 2002; Krapohl 
                                                 
4 Directive 93/39/EEC. A companion Directive, 93/40/EEC, introduced a similar procedure for veterinary 
medicines. The procedures went into effect in 1995. In 1998, the Mutual Recognition Procedure became mandatory 
for all medicines not subject to the CP and introduced in more than one member state.   12
2004). The Europeanization of implementation has also been introduced as a means of 
rationalizing regulatory decision-making in order to reduce the regulatory costs for industry 
((Deboyser 1991 Feick 2005, January)). In general, the new EU agencies have considerably less 
authority than US-type independent regulatory agencies, as their functions are mainly confined to 
information gathering, monitoring and supporting decision-making at Commission or Council level. 
Nevertheless, the impact of EMEA/CPMP goes much beyond providing the Commission with 
expert information, as its professional opinion constitutes a blueprint for the Commission’s final 
regulatory decision.
 5 
Although the attention of this study focuses on the new European procedures, the purely national 
procedures are by no means a residual category but represent still the largest part of applications. 
Furthermore, in the Mutual Recognition Procedure approvals are still granted by national 
authorities, but there are clear procedural obligations for concerned national authorities to 
cooperate even though a formalized coordination infrastructure at the European level has not 
been installed. Still, the MRP contains a Europeanized phase that allows for binding arbitration at 
the European level in cases of disagreement among national authorities. As mentioned above, 
applying companies had an exit option by withdrawing their application from dissenting countries. 
The fundamental institutional innovation of 1993/1995 has been the introduction of the Centralized 
Procedure. For the obligatory medicinal products it deprives pharmaceutical companies of the 
chance to strategically select their target countries and, as a procedure - obligatorily taken (Part A) 
or voluntarily chosen (Part B) – removes regulatory autonomy from the national authorities. 
Regulatory decisions are taken by European institutions and are valid for the entire EU. But as a 
kind of necessary compensation, without which the legislation would have had no chance to pass 
in 1993, national regulatory authorities are closely integrated into the assessment, evaluation and 
decision-making process which, nevertheless, is a European one. 
This regulatory situation characterized the status quo after 1995, with the MRP in full operation 
since 1998. The 1993 Regulation stipulated that an evaluation of the authorization system should 
be undertaken by the Commission in 2001 in order to introduce proposals for legislative 
improvements. This evaluation process became known as the Legislative Review and eventually 
developed into a full-fledged revision of the authorization system, gaining additional urgency by 
                                                 
5 The Commission decision is subject to a regulatory comitology procedure, but so far all final decisions have been 
according to the Commission drafts, and the comitology committee has never referred a Commission decision to the 
Council of Ministers.    13
the fact that 10 new member states were to join the EU in Mai 2004, whose regulatory integration 
would pose problems without preceding reforms. In the end, the legislative revision, 
encompassing new issues as varied as prescription drug advertising and data protection, took 
about three years and was eventually concluded by the end of March 31, 2004 – just one month 
before the new member states joined the EU. 
Table 1: European authorization system since 1995/1998 
Procedure Legal  Basis  Scope 
Centralized Procedure: single 
Community authorization 
Regulation EEC No. 2309/93  Mandatory for biotechnical 
medicines (Part A of Regulation 
Annex) and optional for innovative 







Mandatory for all medicines 
introduced in more than one MS 
and for which the CP is not 
mandatory. 
National procedure: national 
authorization 
Harmonized MS law.  Mandatory for all medicines not 
authorized by the CP and 
introduced only in one MS. 
 
The “Review” of European medicines authorization and legislative 
reform 
The Commission launched the so-called Review of European medicines authorization in 1999, 
by awarding a contract for a report on the existing authorization system to the consulting firms 
CMS Cameron McKenna and Andersen Consulting (CMS Cameron McKenna and Andersen 
Consulting 2000). The consultants based their report on questionnaires distributed to marketing 
authorization holders and consultation with companies, regulatory authorities, governmental   14
ministries, and patient and professional associations
6. Although the authors of the report noted 
that it was difficult to find a general consensus among consultees about questions of detail, they 
offered a number of general conclusions: 
(1) The Centralized Procedure received a generally positive evaluation, and several 
companies and member state authorities supported an extension of the procedure to 
additional products (12). However, there were complaints by companies about the 
efficiency of the decision making process after the CPMP/EMEA has submitted its draft 
decision to the Commission for a final decision. In addition, there were concerns that 
enlargement required a review of CPMP procedures and institutional structure (15). 
(2) The Decentralized Procedure was in for greater criticism: the report concluded that 
“[t]here is no true mutual recognition” as member states repeated assessment and 
authorization processes that they were supposed to recognize. The report specifically 
pointed to the “risk to public health” argument, whose unclear delineation allowed 
member states to raise points that were only remotely related to public health. 
Companies furthermore complained about the fact that arbitration procedures prevented 
the introduction of medicines in states in which they had been approved before the 
arbitration process had concluded. 
(3) The report highlighted that innovative companies and several national authorities 
perceived a need to harmonize protection periods for research data, and to extend those 
periods for research on new indications, in order to improve access to medicines and 
innovation in the pharmaceutical industry (19). 
(4) In view of the 2004 EU enlargement, the report argued that the internal structure of the 
CPMP had to be reformed. In particular, the report argues that, “at the very least,” the 
size of national representation in the Committee had to be reduced (38). Also, several 
regulators were in favor of basing membership on expertise rather than national quotas 
(38). 
                                                 
6 According to the report, the following actors were included in the consultation: national authorities (including 
those in EU accession countries), the head and “key personnel” of EMEA, the chairmen of the EMEA scientific 
committees, including CPMP, and the Mutual Recognition Facilitation Groups, marketing authorization holders who 
had used the CP and MRP, pharmaceutical industry associations, national ministries for health, social services, 
finances, and agriculture (also in accession countries), national professional associations representing physicians, 
dentists, pharmacists and veterinarians, patient associations, and national consumer associations.   15
It is interesting to note that the report does not make any recommendations on a number of issues 
that became highly contentious in the legislative process, for example the limited permission of 
advertising for prescription drugs.  
After further consultation in the Joint Human and Veterinary Pharmaceutical Committees, a public 
hearing, and the circulation of discussion documents, the Commission adopted its proposals for a 
new regulation and two new directives (one for veterinarian medicines) on July 18, 2001. The 
proposals suggested an extension of the CP’s scope: mandatory for all medicines with new active 
substances and optional for therapeutic innovations and generics of centrally approved medicines; 
also, they proposed abbreviated deadlines for member states to comment on proposed 
authorizations in the CP. The Commission also proposed to reduce the size of the CPMP (and the 
CVMP, its veterinary counterpart) to one delegate per member state (down from two) and added 
five additional members that were to be chosen for scientific expertise; EMEA’s management 
board would have been changed from a body mainly representing the member states to a body 
with equal representation for Council, Commission, and EP, and additional representations of 
patients and industry. In addition, the Commission proposals defined a harmonized 10-year period 
of data protection, with a one-year extension for new therapeutic indications. With respect to the 
DP/MRP, the Commission proposals made mutual recognition mandatory for all medicines to be 
authorized in more than one member state; they reduced the time for member states to forward 
existing marketing approvals to other MS and to grant the final marketing authorization; mutual 
recognition could be denied only for “serious potential risk to public health,” which tightened the 
existing language a little bit. The informal Mutual Recognition Facilitation Group was proposed to 
be formalized as a Coordination Group, to provide consultation in cases of conflict between 
member states over mutual recognition. Although the Commission proposal did not make 
arbitration mandatory, it proposed to shorten the time line within which arbitration takes place. 
Between February and October 2002, the proposals were debated in various EP committees; the 
main debate on the legislation occurred in the Committee for Environment, Public Health and 
Food Safety (ENVI)
7; the proposals attracted more than 600 amendments in the committee. The 
Parliament’s first reading took place on October 23, 2002, increasing the number of amendments 
to around 1000. The Council did not decide on a common position until September 2003 – the 
main part of the common position had been agreed upon in the Council’s Working Party and in 
                                                 
7 Rapporteurs were Rosemarie Müller (PES, Germany) for the Regulation and Françoise Grossetête 
(EEP-ED, France) for the Directives.   16
Coreper, but two important issues needed involvement of the Council of Ministers in June 2003 –, 
creating time pressure to pass the legislation relatively quickly before the accession of ten 
additional members of the European Union. Using informal consultation between the EP, the 
Council (Working Party) and the Commission before the second reading of the Parliament, the 
laws could be passed by March 31, 2004. 
Space does not allow for a detailed analysis of the decision making process in this study. Instead, 
we focus on the policy outcomes and the political cleavages involved. Since the legislative 
proposals on EU medicines authorization were so complex (the number of parliamentary 
amendments serves as a good indicator), we also had to focus on specific issues and ignore 
others. First of all, the legislation dealt with the authorization of both human and veterinary 
medicines; we deal exclusively with provisions concerning human medicines. Furthermore, we 
focus on issues that we consider (a) particularly important and (b) indicators for the degree of 
Europeanization of pharmaceuticals authorization. This means that we ignore some issues that 
turned out to be important from the perspective of several actors involved. For example, following 
industry interests the Commission proposed to permit direct patient information by the industry 
about certain groups of prescription drugs; this issue raised a storm of lobbying activities by public 
health and other non-industry groups who were strictly opposed to any such proposal, which they, 
like most member states, interpreted as a permit to advertise prescription drugs directly to 
patients. Since this issue does not provide much insight into the question of Europeanization, we 
do not analyze it here.  
Table 2 introduces the issues under consideration and specifies how they relate to questions of 
European-level v. member state control of policy making and implementation. The constitutional 
basis for the regulation was not a controversial issue before the legislation reached the Council. 
Under Article 95 TEC, the original basis proposed by the Commission, the legislation was decided 
under codecision and with qualified majority rule in the Council. Several member states, however, 
viewed Article 308 TEC as the appropriate basis. Under this proposal, the Parliament would have 
been less influential (consultation), and the Council decision would have to be made unanimously, 
increasing the veto power of individual member states. 
The scope of the Centralized Procedure is importantly related to the degree of European control 
over pharmaceuticals authorization as it is the only “real” European procedure and has been the 
most successful European authorization procedure so far. A related issue is the possible   17
introduction of tighter deadlines within the CP, which would make the procedure more attractive 
for medicines that do not fall under its mandatory scope but for which the CP is optional. 
Regarding the Mutual Recognition/Decentralized Procedures
8, there were several issues that 
most likely influence the viability and acceptance of the procedures. The first issue deals with the 
sequencing of the decisions of the Reference Member State (RMS), which prepares the reference 
assessment, and the Concerned Member State (CMS), which has to decide whether to recognize 
the RMS’s assessment. Whereas under the old MRP, the RMS decided before the CMS(s), 
proposals for simultaneous decision making were introduced, in order to improve the 
communication between the two states. A related issue dealt with the question whether arbitration 
should remain optional, with companies being able to withdraw their application from CMS(s) that 
raised objections to mutual recognition. One proposal was to combine mandatory arbitration with 
a provisional authorization of contested medicines in states in which the authorities were willing to 
grant an authorization. 
Decisions related to the composition of the EMEA management board and Scientific Committees 
(in our case: CPMP) were to determine the degree to which those bodies developed a European 
identity. In general, the conflicts surrounding these issues dealt with the question whether those 
bodies should be representative of the various member state authorities, or whether they should 
be decidedly European bodies, with members chosen for their expertise and not necessarily 
appointed by national authorities. A stronger European identity of EMEA/CPMP would decrease 
national influence and increase supranational control over implementing bodies. 
Two further issues that we investigate deal with the harmonization of standards. First, the 
definition of “serious public health concern” is essential to the functioning of the MRP/DP, as it is 
the reason for which CMS can deny mutual recognition of regulatory assessments. A uniform 
European definition of this term therefore might prevent frivolous use of this term. Second, the 
harmonization of data protection is important with respect of the protection of innovating 
companies, on the one hand, and for the establishment of a European market for generics, on the 
other. This issue gained particular importance with the prospect of the 2004 EU expansion, as 
                                                 
8 The Mutual Recognition Procedure is applied when a product has already been approved in one or 
more Member States and approval is sought in one or more additional Member States. In the equivalent 
Decentralised Procedure the product has not yet received authorisation in any Member State. Both sub-
procedures belong to the same category because the decision-making processes are fundamentally 
identical.   18
several of the accession states had comparatively short or no periods of scientific data protection, 
adding to the differences already existing among the member states. 
Policy outcomes, cleavages, and tentative conclusions 
In this section, we discuss the policy outcomes of the legislative process, again focusing on the 
issues introduced in the previous chapter. In addition, we summarize the political cleavages 
associated with an issue and use these observations to draw first, tentative conclusions about 
the degree of Europeanization and the possible future of the EU system of medicines 
authorization. Table 3 provides an overview of our conclusions. 
The Treaty basis: Co-Decision and Qualified Majority or Consultation and 
Unanimity?  
The Commission proposed Art. 95 TEC as legal basis for the legislative decision making 
process, which required the parliamentary co-decision described in Art. 251 TEC; not 
surprisingly, the European Parliament endorsed this position. Despite strong opposition from 
some member states (particularly Germany, followed by the UK, Denmark, and a few other 
member states), the Commission prevailed, for several reasons. First, it benefited from the first-
mover advantage. The only way for the Council to oppose Article 95 would have been to 
formulate a common position (Art. 251 (2) TEC) which would then go back to the EP for further 
debate and eventual negotiation with the Council. Since there was neither consensus, nor even 
a qualified majority in the Council (Working Party) for an insistence on Art. 308, there was no 
chance to overrule the Commission (and the EP). Thus, given the high hurdles to change the 
Commission’s proposal, the Commission as first mover, or agenda-setter, was in a strong 
position from the very beginning, the opponents in a weak one. Second, time pressure before 
the scheduled enlargement hampered the opposing member states. The necessity to reform at 
least some institutional (EMEA/CPMP) and substantive (especially data protection) matters 
before enlargement outweighed more philosophical differences over the treaty basis to be used. 
Germany and the UK, the two main opponents to Article 95, are among the largest producers of 
innovative medicines, after all, and therefore had a clear interest in a functioning European 
system before accession states increased the ranks of countries with less-innovative 
pharmaceutical industries or none at all. 
The success of the Commission’s proposal for the legal basis of the reform strengthened 
Europeanization in two respects:   19
(a) The  decision rule in the Council. Unanimity was not required in the Council; single 
MSs lost their veto power. Thus, a higher threshold was established for the Council to 
refute Commission proposals. As a result of this and other institutional prerequisites, the 
Commission, a supranational institution, gained stronger agenda-setting powers. 
(b) Participatory rights / actor inclusion. The co-decision procedure gave the EP, the 
other more supranationally oriented institution, an important role in the legislative 
process, further strengthening the European perspective. 
Legal harmonization 
The past implementation of the MRP/DP had been hampered by the existence of diverging 
national standards such as those regarding the definition of public health risk, nationally varying 
Summaries of Product Characteristics (SmPCs), or the related content of package leaflets
9. 
Hence, questions of legal harmonization obtained an importance that went beyond the search 
for uniform standards; they were of fundamental relevance for the improvement of the 
decentralized European authorization system. 
Data protection 
The debates on data protection pitted member states with no or little data protection, together 
with the generics industry, against member states with strong innovative pharmaceutical 
industries, who were interested in monopoly returns on their research investment that were not 
diluted by generics competition. In addition, member states had an interest in containing health 
care costs by promoting the consumption of generics, creating a dilemma for those member 
states with a strong innovative industry. The interests in the Council Working Party were rather 
diverse, and in the end the Council of Ministers had to decide this issue. At times the array of 
different proposals by the different institutional actors made for different protection periods 
(depending on the approval procedure utilized and the type of medicinal product processed) 
became very confusing. Practically at the last moment, before the second reading of the 
directive in the EP, Council, EP, and Commission reached a compromise on the so-called 
8+2+1 formula: Ten years of data protection plus one additional year for additional indications. 
After 8 years, generics producers were permitted to prepare approval applications based on 
                                                 
9 We did not find any evidence that divergent national periods of data protection (application data utilized by the 
originator) were hampering the MRP; however, it is clear that these national differences imposed restrictions on the 
single market in medicines, as they led to divergent markets in generics.   20
existing scientific data, even though they were not allowed to market their products before the 
ten- (or even-) year period had passed (so-called BOLAR provision). The compromise satisfied 
the innovative industry, which had been confronted with much less protection in some countries, 
but also gave something to the generic companies – and to those caring for cost-containment in 
the national health care systems. 
The harmonization of data protection is a remarkable outcome as it constitutes a clear success 
in terms of Europeanization of rules. There are several reasons for this, mainly related to the 
heterogeneity of actor interests: First, we can identify a coalition of member states with strong 
innovative industries, the innovative industry, and the Commission, in favor of comparatively 
long protection periods. The main opposition to a high level of data protection was voiced in 
Parliament, by the generics industry, and by some member states, including the accession 
states, with no or a little innovative industry and an interest in the containment of health care 
costs through. But even member states with an innovative industry had to consider the interests 
of its generics producers and health care institutions. In the end the Parliament was 
instrumental in proposing the compromise solution. Second, the harmonization of data 
protection has a comparatively strong functional justification; as mentioned before, unequal 
periods of data protection constituted an impediment for the single market in generics. As a 
result, even though it would have preferred a lower level of data protection, the generics 
producers could not be completely against the harmonization as such. 
Potential risk to public health 
Although this was an important topic – the unclear definition of public health risk arguably 
contributed to the problems encountered with the MRP, and the problem was mentioned by the 
Cameron McKenna/Andersen report – the outcome is somewhat ambiguous, and the question 
created very little controversy. A precise definition was not included in the legislative package 
and will have to be specified in a Commission guideline (Art. 29, 2. of Directive 2004/27/EC; a 
proposal was published in February of 2005). It is unclear, whether the definition proposed by 
the Commission, and its implementation, will in fact strengthen mutual recognition, or whether 
individual member states will find additional ways to deny it. A similar question is raised by the 
definition of generic medicines claiming to be “essentially similar” to already authorized 
products. The effect of such definitions will partly depend on their interplay with institutional 
factors, such as mandatory arbitration and provisional authorization during arbitration, and their   21
interpretation by the ECJ (see, for example, the January 20, 2005, ruling in SmithKline 
Beecham v. Lægemiddelstyrelsen, in which the Court made use of a comparatively broad 
definition of essential similarity). 
Institutional and procedural changes in the context of the European 
approval procedures 
Some of the regulatory outcomes were purely symbolic - they changed the names attached to 
organizations and procedures. EMEA became EMA, CPMP became CHPM, and the Mutual 
Recognition Facilitation Group became the Coordination Group. Not surprisingly, our focus is on 
the more substantive institutional and procedural changes, even though the symbolic changes 
may reflect some of those substantive changes. 
The Scope of the Centralized Procedure 
The question to which extent the Central Procedure should be applied, and even be mandatory, 
to additional categories of medicines was one of the most controversial issues of the legislative 
reform that at Council level had to be decided by the Council of Ministers. On the one side, the 
EP, supported mainly by France, was in favor of an extension of the CP’s scope, as proposed 
by the Commission (the EP even went further than the Commission). On the other side, the 
majority of member states were opposed to a weakening of national or nationally-based 
(MRP/DP) procedures – some even proposing the free choice between CP and MRP/DP.
10 
Since a restriction of the CP’s mandatory scope was not realistic, the political aim of the 
nationally oriented governments was to prevent a substantial extension of the scope. The EP’s 
proposal to require the CP for all new active substances would have been such a substantial 
extension; as a compromise (and partial success for the “nationalists”), the scope was enlarged 
only in regard to new active substances for four medical indications. 
The significance of the scope extension, in terms of Europeanization of authorization 
procedures, is under dispute. The nationally oriented governments maintain that the extension 
did not result in a significant shift to the European level, as medicines for the specified 
                                                 
10 In fact, large parts of industry supported such a completely free choice between procedures, 
as this would have given applicants or pharmaceutical entrepreneurs more “flexibility,” a value in 
itself for industry. The reason why industry supported the Commissions proposal of scope-
extension was that it expected something in exchange from the Commission: the right of direct-
to-patient “information” (which failed) and more, as well as harmonized, data protection.   22
indications had already predominantly been authorized through the CP. On the other hand, 
several Europe-oriented actors point to the fact that the final compromise stipulates that the 
scope will be extended again in four years’ time, then including also new active substances for 
“the treatment of auto-immune diseases and other immune dysfunctions and viral diseases.” 
(Directive 2004/27/EC, (8)). This would, in their view, finally include practically almost all new 
active substances which had not been included obligatorily, so far.   
In the short term the supporters of Europeanization may seem to have lost their case, but in the 
longer term they may have won it. This evaluation is shared by supporters of continuing national 
authority
11. While the defenders of national autonomy try to resist Europeanization in the name 
of national public health protection and political responsibility for it, they easily admit that the 
general thrust is towards increased Europeanization. Their main goal is to slow down this 
process (“step by step”-approach) and to assure an institutional configuration that would leave 
the national level participation rights in the assessment and authorization processes (“network-
approach” versus institutional centralization/European FDA). Some representatives of national 
authorities freely admit that they might not be able to prevent a European FDA – but they may 
delay it for another 20 or 30 years. 
Centralized Procedure: Evaluation and approval deadlines 
The question here was whether deadlines should be shortened to increase regulatory efficiency 
to the advantage of pharmaceutical companies. The proposal of the Commission mainly 
reduced the evaluation times of the rapporteurs and co-rapporteurs, who prepare the CPMP 
draft assessments together with their respective member state authorities. Shorter deadlines 
would have substantially reduced the assessment and evaluation work of national regulatory 
authorities in preparation of CPMP decisions. Other proposals suggested shorter decision 
processes at EMEA level after the Scientific Committee’s (CPMP) assessment, and then later at 
the Commission stage. While there was a general sense that regulatory efficiency should be 
raised, most national governments strongly opposed a reduction of assessment and evaluation 
periods at the national level. The Council, finally, succeeded in restoring the original deadlines 
for assessments and evaluations at the MS level, while obliging the Commission to accelerate 
its purely administrative procedures.  
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The conflict over evaluation and approval deadlines reveals interesting lines of conflict. On the 
one hand, there is a conflict between speed and efficiency of procedures and the level of public 
health protection. Several member state authorities, public health groups, industry critics, and 
some MEPs opposed the acceleration of assessment and evaluation processes, as they may 
lead to less thorough assessments; on the other hand, potential applicants for authorizations 
were interested in a speedy process, which was usually justified by increased-access 
arguments. On the other hand, there was a conflict between member states and Commission: 
While the Commission tried to speed up the process by forcing member states to accept shorter 
deadlines, the member states restored those deadlines and forced the Commission to accept 
shorter deadlines for its own decisions. 
While it is obvious that this was a defeat of the Commission against national governments and 
authorities, it is not so clear whether the substantive outcome fostered or inhibited 
Europeanization. Certainly, national authorities have defended their regulatory space. On the 
other hand, by strengthening of the assessment and evaluation components of European 
authorization procedures, which are mainly performed at the national level, the member states 
may also have strengthened the credibility of European authorization processes. 
MRP/DP: Obligatory binding arbitration 
The most important issue in the reform of the MRP/DP has been the question whether binding 
arbitration should be obligatory if a Concerned Member State (CMS) raises objections to a 
Reference Member State’s (RMS) assessment and authorization decision. Although previous 
legislation had provided for binding arbitration, applicants could avoid the lengthy process by 
withdrawing their application in the dissenting member state. The legislative reforms have 
closed this loophole with a combination of provisions: First, disagreements concerning 
assessments will “immediately” be reported to EMEA “with a view to application of the 
procedure under articles 30 …” (Art. 29, 4. of Directive 2004/27/EC) which signifies the 
obligation to enter binding arbitration. Second, and very important, withdrawal of an application 
does not prevent the arbitration procedure. Third, member states who accept the RMS’s 
decision may provisionally authorize the medicinal product for marketing, pending the arbitration 
outcome. (Art. 29, 6. of Directive 2004/27/EC) The third point made binding arbitration more 
palatable for industry and national authorities, the latter having preferred the status quo.    24
As it stands, the new provision seems to strengthen the European level compared to the 
member states. However, the impact of the new provisions is uncertain until it is implemented. 
For example, it is not clear what happens if mutual arbitration results in a denial of authorization, 
even though some MS provisionally authorized the product. Theoretically, the product would 
lose its authorization also in those states that had originally permitted it. Would this be 
enforceable? Would applicants be able to pursue liability claims against the Commission or 
member states for allowing them to market their products, only to withdraw the approval after 
arbitration? Or was the rule written under the assumption that, practically, arbitration would 
always result in a decision in favor of the RMS’s and the mutually recognizing CMS’s position? 
(The problem may sound more dramatic than it actually is: Often, the subject of arbitration is not 
the general approval decision, but rather details of the approval as contained in the Summaries 
of Product Characteristics (SmPC).) 
MRP/DP: Change in procedural sequence 
This seems to be a minor change but one with possibly important future effects. While in the 
past the MRP foresaw that in the first phase the RMS had to issue its regulatory decision before 
the CMSs started their consideration – whether to accept the authorization or raise serious 
concerns on public health grounds – the new legal text introduces a different sequencing of the 
regulatory decision process: The RMS will inform the CMSs of its evaluatory position before 
arriving at a final regulatory decision, thus providing room for discussion with CMSs and 
allowing for mutual adjustments among RMS and CMSs. This increases the likelihood that the 
RMS’s final conclusions will be mutually recognized. 
Together with the introduction of obligatory binding arbitration, the change of procedural 
sequence can be regarded as strengthening the European aspect of a procedure that is still 
nationally based. The threat of binding arbitration may induce member states to use the 
opportunity of closer cooperation and voluntary mutual adjustment provided by the new 
sequence of decision making.  
MRP/DP: Deadlines for evaluations and regulatory decision-making 
Comparable to the deadline provision in the CP, the Commission proposed a reduction of the 
time Concerned Member States should have for commenting on the RMS’s assessment and 
evaluation, and for arriving at their own position, be it mutual recognition or raising public health   25
concerns. In the past, the CMSs often replicated the evaluation assessment procedures already 
conducted by the RMS’s regulatory authority, which led to delays in the approval process. 
Tighter deadlines could have helped avoid this problem. As in the CP many national 
governments opposed the reduction of the time resources available to their regulatory 
authorities with the argument that it was, in the end, national governments and authorities that 
were accountable for national authorizations.  
Institutional-organizational modifications: EMEA and MRFG 
EMEA / CPMP 
The questions surrounding the organizational reform of EMEA (now: EMA) and CPMP (now: 
CHMP) have been very conflictual, with the main lines of conflict drawn between 
Commission/European Parliament and most member states. Societal interests were almost not 
concerned about the issue; the few statements that one finds tended to support the 
Commission/Parliament stance. The Commission’s proposals concerning the composition and 
selection of the EMEA Management Board and the CPMP not only tried to take enlargement 
into account, by reducing the number of representatives of each member states, they also tried 
to reduce the influence of national governments on the selection of members. The Parliament 
went even further, proposing that EMEA should attain the same structure as the newly created 
European Food Safety Agency (EFSA), which would have reduced national influence even 
more. The final compromise solution largely maintained national government representation and 
role in the selection of members. One concession to the Commission was that the CPMP could 
co-opt five additional members on the basis of expertise, to complement areas of possibly 
missing expertise among the 25 representatives chosen by their respective national authorities. 
In addition, supranational expertise was strengthened by further developing the system of 
Working Groups and Scientific Panels at EMEA level. The proposal by the Commission and the 
EP, to include patient/consumer representatives on EMEA’s supervisory Management Board, 
was undisputed, but not the proposal of the Commission to include industry representation. The 
latter was supported only by France, which employed the same arrangement in its regulatory 
Agency.  
On the whole, the member states have been able to maintain their institutional position and 
influence within the organizational structure of the European authorization system. However, 
there have also been incremental changes towards a stronger emphasis on expertise, in   26
contrast to member state representation, in the EMEA. Even though these changes are 
comparatively small, some members of national authorities see them as symbolic of the erosion 
of their own monopoly on scientific expertise. Adding to this is the strengthening of scientific 
panels and working groups at EMEA-level, mainly with the task of complementing and helping 
the CPMP (CHMP). 
MRFG – Coordination Group  
The Mutual Recognition Facilitation Group had been an informal group established and 
maintained by the heads of national authorities in order to facilitate the introduction and 
performance of the MRP/DP. This Group has been officially recognized by the new legislation, 
which renames it “Coordination Group” and provides it with a secretariat at EMA. This 
institutional change was uncontroversial and can be regarded as supporting the Europeanizing 
elements of the MRP/DP.  
Discussion and Conclusion 
With this paper, we want to learn more about the direction that European pharmaceuticals policy 
has taken and might take in the future: Did the recent legislative reforms increase the 
importance and impact of the European level, both in terms of regulatory decisions taken at the 
European and the national levels and in terms of the character of the European institutions 
involved? And if so, is the increased European importance likely to last? Is it part of a trend? 
Regarding the first question, we can diagnose an incremental increase in Europeanization, but it 
was a very limited increase even though some changes might produce important effects in the 
future (e.g. obligatory binding arbitration in the MRP/DP). Member states were rather successful 
in preventing too much transfer of authority to the supranational level: They largely maintained 
control over the appointment of EMEA and CPMP members; consented – for the time being -
only to a limited extension of the CP’s scope; and resisted an acceleration of the national 
components (assessments and evaluations) of European authorization procedures. On the 
other hand, member states had to make concessions: Codecision and qualified majority rule 
seem to be firmly established for pharmaceuticals approval and pharmacovigilance regulation; 
and the changes in the Mutual Recognition Procedure/ Decentralized Procedure, with obligatory 
binding arbitration and the option of provisional authorizations, may in fact force them to 
recognize authorization decisions of other member states. And in the case of the CP’s scope,   27
member states agreed to further extensions within four years. In addition, European agencies 
such as EMEA, being part of and coordinating networks of national regulatory authorities, may 
lead to the development of “cosmopolitan” bureaucrats with a European orientation, thus 
Europeanizing the behavioral orientation of national agencies in the long run (Majone 2002; 
Wessels 1997; interviews with national regulators). 
As to the future development of European pharmaceuticals authorization, our results or guesses 
can only be tentative. We found no issues in which decision making followed a clear functional 
dynamic; on the other hand, virtually all issues were characterized by conflicts between different 
actors, often pitting European-level institutions against member states. The harmonization of 
regulatory data protection was the only issue that may have been partially influenced by 
functional requirements, as different periods of data protection caused an impediment to the 
single market in generics. But even in regard to this issue, we could identify clear conflicts 
between different industry and member state interests that drove the final outcome. 
Depending on the issue, political cleavages either separated member states from European 
institutions (particularly in issues regarding regulatory authorities), or they separated different 
member states, with societal interests, Commission and Parliament on different sides (for 
example, data protection or the acceleration of assessment and evaluation). As a result, the 
specific constellation of interests seems to depend on the specific issue. But as long as the 
constellation of the different interests involved remains fairly stable and is reflected in the 
diverse and complex procedural configuration, we should expect the European authorization 
system to remain be fairly stable as well. 
On the other hand, if there should be a change in the relative strength of different social, 
economic, and political interests, for example a stronger role of public health services and social 
insurances, it is thinkable that national authorities and the national level, in general, may retain 
or regain more influence in the future.. But is such a reversal really conceivable? There are a 
number of reasons, most of which have been mentioned or touched upon above, why such a 
“regression” seems unlikely: 
1.  First of all, the whole configuration of marketing approval regulation for pharmaceuticals 
seems to represent a rather robust equilibrium, balancing a complex regulatory task 
environment and a heterogeneous interest structure that comprise practically all relevant 
actors, stakeholders and affected groups, with an equally complex regulatory and   28
procedural configuration. This system might represent an “institutional isomorphism” 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983) which may provide the ground for further refinement and 
evolution in the direction of further Europeanization – of course always respecting the 
balance between the different, (especially economic and institutional) interests. 
2.  Related to point 1: National regulatory authorities, although losing autonomy, are 
included in the European procedures as indispensable participants, thus protecting their 
interest in organizational survival. This means that the interests of the potentially most 
critical adversaries of further Europeanization are quite well protected – at least for the 
foreseeable future. 
3.  Even among national regulatory authorities there are those who prefer further procedural 
Europeanization due to their limited own regulatory capacities. 
4.  Pharmaceutical marketing approval is now partly imbedded into international structures 
which even go beyond the European level and in which the EU regulatory authority 
already plays an important part on behalf of the European Community and, thus, all the 
national regulatory authorities. This is the context of the International Conference on 
Harmonization, in which the US, Japan and the EU take part, and where standards 
concerning the quality, safety and efficacy data for applications and assessments have 
been defined and integrated in a Common Technical Document. (see Vogel 1998, 
Sickmüller 1996) It is hard to perceive that the rather strong and institutionalized position 
of the EU regulatory authority in this international environment (see Art. 57, 1. (j) of 
Regulation (EC) No 726/2004) should be dismantled. 
5.  Looking for potential actors opposing further Europeanization, other than national 
regulatory authorities, one might cite representatives of national health care systems, 
certain consumer protection groups or specific pharmaceutical and medical critics. There 
are demands to consider the interests of national health care systems more thoroughly, 
to add additional criteria for marketing approval, to increase safety requirements and 
restrict relations between regulators and industry. Most of these criticisms apply to the 
national as well as to the European procedures. Regarding additional approval criteria 
such as comparative effectiveness controls, cost-effectiveness considerations etc., these 
demands are also not heard and not met at national levels, as far as marketing 
authorization is concerned. And where these additional criteria are observed, they are   29
introduced in procedures that are not part of the marketing approval process. 
Concerning the stricter safety requirements and greater distance between regulators and 
applicants, the problem is practically the same at the national level. In general, the 
European Centralized Procedure and the EMA have the advantage of being more open 
and transparent than most national regulatory agencies and procedures – which is 
acknowledged by the critics. In fact, for them the European institution and procedures 
might be the better target for improvement than the national agencies and procedures, 
and in the European Parliament they even seem to have an increasingly strong policy-
coalition partner – the EP has successfully introduced many transparency requirements 
in the legislative review 
As mentioned before, these conclusions are at best tentative and further analysis is required, 
including the analysis of additional issues which have been discussed in the reform process, 
and also those that have been non-issues. But even if one would subscribe to a trend towards 
further Europeanization, the institutional configuration of such a future Europeanized structure is 
not pre-determined. Even among regulatory authorities in the same member state different 
institutional preferences can be found. There are those who would prefer the further 
development of the existing “network” structure in which autonomously evaluating national 
regulatory authorities are part of a larger system coordinated by a European authority. And then 
there are others who, under the banner of “centers of excellence”, would prefer a more 
centralized structure, a kind of European FDA in which these specialized centers would be 
components of a more integrated and homogenous organizational structure. (see interviews 
with German, French, and British regulators).   30
Table 2: Issues discussed in the paper 
Issues  Relationship to Europeanization 
institutional meta-level 
Constitutional basis: 
-Art. 95 TEC (codecision of EP; 
qualified majority in Council)or 
- Art. 308 (consultation of EP; 
unanimity in Council)? 
Art. 95 provides individual member states with fewer opportunities to 
block provisions they do not agree with. 
Higher level of EU-institution involvement. 
institutional and procedural issues 
Scope of the Centralized 
Procedure: All medicines? All 
medicines with new active 
substances? Only biotech 
medicines? 
Larger scope increases the reach of the Centralized Procedure that is 
more successfully Europeanized and reduces the impact of single 
national authorities. 
Shorter deadlines in the 
Centralized Procedure 
Improves the efficiency of the CP, making it more attractive. 
Mutual Recognition/ Decentralized 
Procedure: 
- Sequencing of DP: RMS and 
CMS decide simultaneously; 
- obligatory binding arbitration; 
- option of provisional 
authorization; 
- shorter deadlines for MS. 
 
 
- May be a crucial mechanisms to make the DP a viable European 
authorization procedure in view of homogeneous regulatory decisions 
and the creation of a single market.; 
 
 
- regulatory efficiency considerations, but indirectly also incentive for 
CMSs to adopt the RMS’s assessment  
EMEA management board 
composition and selection 
Change towards equal representation of Council, Commission, and 
EP would strengthen the EU-institutions versus MSs. 
CHMP (formerly CPMP) 
composition and selection 
The main question was whether this Scientific Committee should 
represent national regulatory authorities or be composed mainly of 
“independent” experts and whether they should be selected by 
national authorities or EU-bodies. 
MRP/DP 
Institutionalization of position and 
role of the MRFG (Mutual 
Recognition Facilitation Group) 
Legal institutionalization would increase the chances to arrive at 
mutual recognition and, thus, strengthen the Europeanization aspect 
of the procedure. 
legal harmonisation issues 
Application data protection: How 
many years? 
With or without Bolar provision? 
Harmonization of standards and facilitating a single market for 
generics..   31
Issues  Relationship to Europeanization 
Operational definition of serious 
public health concerns 
A clear definition may reduce the opportunity for MSs to deny mutual 
recognition, thus strengthening the Europeanization aspect of the 
procedure. 
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Table 3: Outcomes of the legislative process 
Issues  Policy outcome  Main cleavage 
Constitutional basis: Art. 95 
TEC (codecision, qualified 
majority) or Art. 308 TEC 
(consultation, unanimity)? 
Art. 95 TEC  Commission and several MSs (F, FIN, 
B, NL, IRL) for Art. 95 // D, DK, UK 
(and tendentially E, P, I, GR) for Art. 
308 
Scope of the Centralized 
Procedure: All medicines? All 
medicines with new active 
substances? Only biotech 
medicines? 
Extension of CP to new active 
substances for four groups of 
indications: diabetes, aids, 
cancer, neurodegenerative 
disorders; 
After 20 May 2008 extension to 
auto-immune diseases, immune  
dysfunctions and viral diseases; 
additionally option to modify this 
list by qualified majority 
(Council) on Commission 
proposal. 
Industry and a majority of MSs for free 
choice of procedures by applicant 
(“flexibility”). // Commission proposes 
extension of scope to new active 
substances, supported by the EP (first 
reading) and some members of the 
regulatory community.// Some public 
health/patient/consumer organizations 
demand the CP for all medicines to be 
marketed in more than one MS. 
Data protection: How many 
years? With or without Bolar 
provision? 
10 years of data protection, with 
possible 1-year extension for 
new indications. 2-year Bolar 
provision allowing generics 
producers to start work on their 
application after.8 years. 
(8+2+1) 
Innovative industry for extended data 
protection. // Commission for 
harmonized 10-year period. // Public 
health/patient/consumer groups, 
generics producers, Council majority, 
and EP majority are for shorter data 
protection.// EP introduces Bolar 
provision. 
Definition of serious public 
health concern 
No definition in the regulation; 
Task of the Commission to 
define guidelines defining the 
meaning of "potential serious 
risk to public health." 
Although described as important by 
some regulatory officials almost 
treated as a non-issue. 
Industry demands a clear, restrictive 
definition. // Commission and MSs 
endorse later adoption of a precise 
definition by the Commission. //Only 
some MSs suggest an expanded 
definition in the Working Party). 
Deadlines in the Centralized 
Procedure 
Commission has 15 (previously 
30) days to act on EMA/CHMP 
position to formulate draft 
decision draft; MSs have 22 
(previously 28) days to 
comment on the draft decision. 
(Deadlines related .to 
“bureaucratic” procedures.) 
No cuts for assessments by 
rapporteurs, co-rapporteurs. 
Industry, EP, and Commission for 
shorter deadlines. // Some MS (DK, D, 
NL, A, I) resist proposed deadline cuts 
for the assessments my national 
regulatory authorities // Public health 
groups and industry critics defend 
longer deadlines for assessments.   33
Issues  Policy outcome  Main cleavage 
Deadlines in the 
DP/MRProcedure 
Attempts to introduce shorter 
deadlines for assessments by 
MS regulatory authorities fail. 
Commission, EP, and industry support 
shorter deadlines for preparation of 
assessment reports and/or CMS 
replies. // Several MS (D, UK, A, NL, 
and others) back the old deadlines. 
Sequencing of DP  Concerned MSs response takes 
place before the Reference MS 
makes its final decision, 
allowing for negotiation among 
both sides. 
Issue was not controversial. 
Obligatory binding arbitration 
in MRP/DP 
Binding arbitration now required 
whenever national regulatory 
authorities fail to find consensus 
in assessments and 
evaluations.  
Not a highly contested issue although 
it reduces national authorities 
autonomy and creates uncertainty 
concerning the arbitration outcome 
and the fate of already approved and 
marketed medicinal products (option 
of provisional authorisation). 
EMEA management board 
composition and selection 
One representative of each MS, 
plus two Commission and two 
EP representatives, two 
representatives of patient 
organizations and one 
representative each of doctors' 
and veterinarians' 
organizations. The patient, 
doctor, and veterinarian reps 
are nominated by the 
Commission and appointed by 
the Council, in consultation with 
the EP. 
Commission proposed equal 
representation of Commission, EP, 
and Council, with additional patient 
and industry representatives 
appointed by the Commission. EP 
proposed the EFSA model, which the 
Commission also endorsed (support 
only from France as MS). // Council 
opposed loss of MS influence in 
Management Board and the inclusion 
of stakeholders (industry). 
CHMP (formerly CPMP) 
composition and selection 
Each MS appoints one CMPH 
member. CMPH may co-opt five 
additional scientific experts, 
nominated by the MS or EMA. 
EP and Commission (supported by 
France) for selection by EMA director 
upon nomination by MS. Support from 
industry.  // Most MS (particularly D, 
DK, UK, NL) vigorously defended their 
traditional position in selecting their 
representatives . 
MRP/DP 
Institutionalization of position 
and role of the MRFG (Mutual 
Recognition Facilitation 
Group) 
Institutionalization of a 
Coordination Group (one 
representative per MS) with 
administrative support from 
EMA and an active role in the 
MRP/DP whenever 
disagreements arise over 
assessments and evaluations; 
but no arbitration competencies 
(Art 27,29 of Directive 
2004/27/EC(Art. 27 Directive) 
Uncontroversial issue of strengthening 
assessment and evaluatory 
deliberations with the view of fostering 
mutual recognition.   34
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